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The Education of the Prof: A Work in Progress 
Michael A. Magill* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The sights and the sounds are instantly familiar. It has 
been more than a decade since I left, but it now seems like I 
never left. As I sit in the waiting room of the Legal Services of-
fice, I am instantly reminded of my earlier tenure in a different 
program, in a different state, and in a different generation. The 
furniture is second-hand. Lining the shelves are brochures de-
scribing the rights of people in areas of law as diverse as repos-
sessions, security deposits, cancellation of contracts, and hous-
ing discrimination. Mfixed to the walls are notices describing 
grievance procedures, posters detailing Head Start programs, 
heat assistance, and Food Stamp facts, and newspaper articles 
showing various accomplishments of the staff. Given the pas-
sage of time, certain aspects of the waiting area appear differ-
ent. For instance, a buzzer was used to announce my entry 
suggesting security concerns. Crates of children's toys and 
books are present, and, perhaps as a concession to the realities 
of today's entertainment world, a VCR is available to watch 
children's videos (fortunately, there are no "Barney" tapes) or 
workshops on "Renting an Apartment" or "The District Justice 
Hearing." The phones ring constantly, a reminder of the ever-
present needs of clients. The responses I overhear indicate the 
urgent nature of many of the inquiries. 
It has been over two decades since I began my legal career 
at Legal Services as a public-service oriented and reform-
minded attorney fresh out of law school. Now, revisiting that 
·Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law, Pennsylvania State University; B.A., Uni-
versity of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law; 
LL.M., Temple University School of Law. The author dedicates this article to the dedi-
cated and caring staff of Legal Services Inc. and expresses his appreciation to Sherry 
Miller for the typing of this manuscript. In addition, my gratitude goes out to the stu-
dent interns of The Dickinson School of Law with whom I served as a colleague during 
my sabbatical. 
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start in light of subsequent career path as a legislative lobbyist, 
a litigator in a private firm, and eventually, a full-time teacher 
upon my return to academia, I am on the brink of yet another 
new experience. Mter having survived the perils of the tenure 
process, it is now time for my first sabbatical. 
As the time of my sabbatical approached, I often thought 
about how to use this respite. So much so, that I put off the 
taking of a sabbatical for one full year while deciding on its 
best application. The thought of returning to practice, without 
the classroom commitment or the committee responsibilities 
began to creep into my mind more and more as I focused on the 
idea of what a sabbatical would mean. This would prompt a 
chance to "try out" what I had been professing; to learn if my 
own self-education over the past few years would make a dif-
ference in the real world; to take the opportunity to be of ser-
vice to those in need; and ultimately, to determine if practice 
would help "inform" my teaching (as well as update my war 
stories!). 
Admittedly, the whole concept of a sabbatical was new to 
me. Having left the nest of law school upon my graduation, I 
had returned to its challenges, although this time from the 
other end of the lectern. Now here I was, on the precipice ofre-
turning to the world of practice I had reveled in during a "past 
life," I questioned my capabilities to revisit it after so many 
years. Would I be able to again switch my energies- this time 
from academic to practitioner? How much of my practice skills 
had I retained? Was it like the proverbial return to riding one's 
bicycle or instead an attempt to mount a motorcycle never be-
fore ridden? How would I react to the realities of advocating in 
arenas where answers are needed today rather than in the fo-
rum where ideas are discussed and shades of gray abound? Be-
yond these important issues, having long escaped the daily te-
dium of wearing suits to work, were mine still in style and 
would they even fit (not to mention the effect they would have 
on my cleaning bill)? 
These fears unresolved, I meet with the managing attorney 
of the office. She appreciates my choice to serve the next four 
months as a volunteer staff attorney. At the same time, she 
questions my background and inclinations toward working 
with the economically disadvantaged. We discuss the needs of 
the clients and office priorities. In reality, the clients' needs 
could never be fully met by the staff, regardless of their abili-
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ties and motivations because there are too many eligible poor 
people with too many legal problems for too few staff members. 
Once again, this is a reminder of my prior days at legal ser-
vices, where inquiries were all too often met with "We're sorry, 
our limited resources put your case outside our priorities," 
when, to the client, his case was his utmost priority. 
I inform the managing attorney that I am very open to 
handling all manner of cases, although she may not have 
wanted me to staff matters that would be difficult to transfer 
upon the completion of my sabbatical. We discuss unemploy-
ment compensation cases (which have a relatively short "life"), 
housing concerns (including evictions), consumer cases (includ-
ing repossessions and bankruptcies), and domestic matters (es-
pecially the protection from abuse cases that dominate office 
resources, both in terms of staffing and hours). We tour the of-
fice and all is a blur; its configuration is peculiar, with path-
ways leading through one office to reach another, shared space, 
and noticeably small quarters. The names of those I meet blend 
together - attorneys, paralegals, support staff, and law stu-
dents working as interns. I admittedly cannot help but add to 
my anxiety the thought of working with some of the students. 
How will they judge my work product, my conduct, my suc-
cesses, and my lack of the same? In student circles, word tends 
to travel fast. I also wonder why one of the paralegals ended 
her welcoming comments by adding that, "I can't believe that 
you gave up your sabbatical to come here!" 
Before I leave the office that initial day, it is decided that I 
will serve on "general intake," handling all substantive areas, 
but with a "mini-specialization" in unemployment compensa-
tion cases. This will alleviate the managing attorney's caseload 
and free up her time to concentrate on necessary administra-
tive concerns. I also decide to spend a few minutes with the 
student interns. They are quite curious about my desire to de-
vote my sabbatical to the office, expressing surprise at my deci-
sion to leave the perceived "comfort" of the academic world. 
They express their own enjoyment of their work, and how they 
believe they are learning how to be "real" lawyers while helping 
those in need. As they discuss their cases, it quickly dawns on 
me that the tables have been turned; though I was once a prac-
titioner, these students have been exposed to the realities of 
state law practice more recently than I have. Consequently, 
they have a better working relationship with state substantive 
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law and rules than I have gained through my years in teaching 
a "national" approach to the law. Yet, they are all very ener-
gized and seem to like the fact that I will be their "colleague" 
doing similar work. The lectern has vanished and I bring only 
my own prior experience to the table. 
I have always stressed preparation in the classroom, both to 
the students and to myself. My own misgivings and desire to 
relieve my pre-sabbatical "stress" had led me to audit our 
school's course in state procedural law, taught, ironically, by 
one of the local trial judges before whom I will appear. My at-
tendance clearly piqued the curiosities of the students, many of 
whom joked (quite inaccurately) that I would "bust the curve." I 
also studied the new state rules of evidence. Coincidentally, 
these were recently enacted by the state supreme court and are 
scheduled for implementation during my sabbatical. Since I 
have taught Evidence from the view of the Federal Rules, the 
previously-fragmented state "rules" rarely entered the picture. 
I secured certification that I had continued to be a member in 
good standing from the supreme court of the previous state in 
which I had practiced, and was temporarily admitted by the 
judiciary to practice for two and one-half years. Likewise, the 
Continuing Legal Education Board gave word of requirements 
to stay licensed during that limited time. I also made it my 
business to familiarize myself with Legal Service's various 
manuals and procedures so that I would be familiar with them 
once my sabbatical began. 
I realized from the beginning that I would be limited in my 
return to practice. After all, it took me years to profess an "ex-
pertise" in my areas of teaching - how much would I really be 
able to learn in the four plus months I would commit to full-
time practice? While I was open and wanted to learn about all 
areas, I remembered that the reality of practice involves "put-
ting out fires" rather than concentrating on specific issues as is 
possible with the time that the academy affords. Admittedly, 
the law professor as an "attorney" is not new concept. 1 How-
ever, the focus is different when one tries to function as both a 
full-time law professor and a trial attorney in a more limited 
capacity.2 My sabbatical thus provides the opportunity to de-
1. Jonathan L. Entin, The Law Professor as Advocate, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
512, 522 (1987-88). 
2. Henry Gabriel, Juggling Scholarship and Social Commitment: Service to the 
Community Through Representing Indigent Criminal Defendants, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J. 
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termine if the teacher can once again become the practitioner; 
if my lessons have advanced my own education and enhanced 
my ability as an educator to teach in the real world. 
This article will discuss my experiences at Legal Services 
from the perspective of how teaching others in the classroom 
affected my own competency in returning to practice. As teach-
ers, we frequently comment about the learning process - how 
our writing informs our teaching and how we learn from our 
students while they are hopefully learning from us. At times 
we may wonder whether we also learn from "ourselves." Will 
our return to practice make us more effective practitioners, 
now that we have had the benefit of the academic life to study 
the "bigger picture?" Will practice be different than it once 
was? How do the rules (or lack thereof), the procedures, and 
the theories we espouse translate to situations in actual fo-
rums? Each part of this article addresses a different aspect of 
the cases I handled. Part II discusses the effect of the existing 
rules and procedures on the pre-hearing preparations for litiga-
tion while Part III focuses on the use of the case theme. Fi-
nally, Part IV presents an example of how the advocate may 
need to use newly enacted rules to educate both the judiciary 
as well as the opponent. 
II. THE INFORMALITY OF RULES: AN END RUN TO DISCOVERY 
My Evidence class focuses on the Federal Rules of Evidence 
as a teaching mechanism by way of both statutory interpreta-
tion and strategies in using the Rules as the propo-
nent/opponent ofvarious proofs. I encourage the students toes-
tablish two records, one for the trier of fact and the other for a 
possible appellate tribunal. We also discuss the importance of 
knowing the local judge's interpretation of the Rules.3 Early on, 
students come to realize how important it is to determine the 
elements of a particular claim so they will know what types 
and sources of proof must be sought during the discovery proc-
ess. Yet, I realized early in my sabbatical that we do not often 
discuss processes in which evidence is proffered to a forum 
223, 227 (1992). 
3. I learned early in my sabbatical that one of the local judges habitually over-
ruled a hearsay objection to all previous out-of-court statements by a declarant-witness 
if that declarant was in court to testifY. If he was "here" in court, nothing he had earlier 
said could be "hearsay"! 
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whose procedures are less than formal. 
An ever-present example of the informality of proceedings 
involves administrative hearings. Due to the nature of my sab-
batical, I was a "short-timer;" I wanted to handle as many 
hearings and appearances as I could, but court cases inevitably 
took longer to develop because of discovery rights and due 
process concerns. By contrast, the administrative process, with 
which I became intimately familiar through unemployment 
compensation cases, moved quickly. There was no pre-hearing 
discovery, no pre-trial orders, and hearings were scheduled 
within a month of the client's claim for benefits. The Rules of 
Evidence were, by statute, loosely applied. 
My representation of clients in unemployment compensa-
tion hearings led me to quickly conclude that the role of advo-
cate in those hearings could be even more challenging than it is 
in courtroom proceedings. In these cases, counsel ardently tries 
to show facts that justify a finding of no "willful misconduct" in 
a termination or "good cause" if the claimant quit her job. 
Given these standards, the cases are very fact-oriented. The 
problem faced by claimant's counsel is therefore to determine 
what proof the employer will try to introduce. While counsel 
has access to documents that the employer submits to the De-
partment of Labor concerning the case, as well as the right to 
subpoena witnesses and documents to the hearing itself, there 
is no formal process to learn which witnesses will testify or the 
substance of their testimony. Therefore, counsel must decide 
whether to contact the client's former employer in an attempt 
to obtain such information or instead rely upon the element of 
"surprise" in appearing with the claimant at the hearing. The 
former may not assure cooperation and could result in the em-
ployer being even more ardent in preparing for the hearing; the 
choice of the latter leaves claimant's counsel pondering just 
how best to prepare. How can one cross-examine witnesses that 
one has not heard testify until the hearing? How does one use 
documents that are first seen at the hearing itself? Do you sub-
poena witnesses when it is possible that they are still working 
for the employer and may show bias against the claimant to 
protect their own employment? 
I was faced with these issues in the case of nurse "W," who 
had been terminated by her nursing home employer for alleged 
"wrongful misconduct." The supervisor's affidavit filed with the 
Department of Labor indicated that she had fired nurse "W" for 
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leaving medication unattended in a hallway and within reach 
of the nursing home residents for several hours during a par-
ticular shift. This allegedly created a "dangerous" condition be-
cause of the risk that these medicines could be taken improp-
erly. The employer further submitted various affidavits from 
nurse "W's" co-workers that they had seen medicine sitting 
unattended in the hallway at various times during that shift. 
Curiously, these affidavits were not signed until days after the 
supervisor's own affidavit; nurse "W" was not terminated until 
then. The claims examiner had denied unemployment compen-
sation benefits to nurse "W'' based on the affidavits of her co-
workers. We then filed an appeal requesting a hearing. 
During our initial office conference, nurse "W" vehemently 
denied ever having left medications unattended. She described 
in detail her daily itinerary and the location of medications 
throughout that time. In discussing the affidavits of her former 
colleagues, she suggested that her supervisor could be quite 
"heavy-handed" and may have exerted "pressure" to sign them 
after-the-fact. I queried whether these employees would appear 
at the hearing and if they would admit to such suspected coer-
cion. The answers were not self-evident yet could prove critical 
to the results of the hearing. Nurse "W'' and I discussed the 
pros and cons of contacting these potential witnesses. While 
they might talk to me, they were not obligated to do so. They 
could alert the employer to nurse "W's" representation at the 
hearing. Weighing these risks, we decided on a strategy where 
the client became her own "discoverer" - she knew each of the 
affiants, she would call them and discuss things "casually." We 
scripted questions for her to ask: What had they seen that day? 
When had they seen it? What had prompted them to fill out 
their affidavits? Were they going to be attending the hearing? 
If they had evidence favorable to nurse "W" would they testify 
to this at the hearing, either voluntarily or via subpoena? 
Nurse "W" proved a worthy investigator. She contacted the 
affiants and learned that the supervisor had requested each of 
them to sign affidavits, suggesting what to state in them. They 
did not think that they would be asked to testify because the 
supervisor had recently assured them that the situation was 
"under control" and that she only needed their affidavits. How-
ever, none of the affiants were willing to testify for nurse "W." 
They did not want to risk their own employment by testifying 
about the supervisor's improper contacts. 
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The day of the hearing arrived. The supervisor appeared, 
accompanied by the nursing home manager and counsel. How-
ever, none of the affiants came. The supervisor was allowed to 
testify to her own recollections concerning the medications, but 
I objected to the admission of the affidavits as hearsay. The in-
formality of the process again created a problem. An adminis-
trative tribunal is not bound by all the "technical rules of evi-
dence" that are followed in a court oflaw; 4 nonetheless, hearsay 
evidence cannot by itself support a finding offact.5 My objection 
was not fully sustained, yet this ruling did not prove fatal to 
our case. Nurse "W" testified as to her own care with the medi-
cations and as to her conversations with each of the affiants. 
Although the employer objected on hearsay grounds, I re-
sponded that such testimony was offered for the limited pur-
pose of impeachment. I must admit that for a minute I thought 
I noticed a "deer in the headlights" expression on the hearing 
officer's face; I went on to explain that the affiants' statements 
to nurse "W' did not have to be taken for their truth value, but 
only for the fact that they were said. This would impeach 
whatever value the affidavits might otherwise have. The em-
ployer was not limited in its cross-examination of nurse "W." 
The hearing officer hesitated and a long moment passed before 
he admitted this testimony for impeachment purposes. 
In my closing argument, I noted the tainted nature of the 
affidavits as well as their suspect timing. I maintained that the 
heavy-handed nature of the supervisor's conduct made her own 
testimony suspect. The very fact that others, including the su-
pervisor, had supposedly seen the "dangerous" medication left 
out for hours and had not locked it away belied that this had 
ever happened. 
The decision arrived two weeks later. The hearing officer 
held that there was no "willful misconduct;" the employer had 
not met its burden of proving that the medication had been left 
unattended. The decision noted that the supervisor's own tes-
timony was made all the more incredulous by her conduct in 
securing the affidavits under very suspicious circumstances. It 
was my first hearing in a decade - a chance to use what I had 
4. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505. See also Vann v. UCBR, 494 A.2d 1081 (Pa. 
Cornrow. 1985). 
5. Anderson v. Commonwealth Dept. of Pub. Wei., 468 A.2d 1167, 1169 (Pa. 
Cornrow. 1983); Burks v. Cornrow. Dept. Of Pub. Wei. 408 A.2d 912, 914 (Pa. Cornrow. 
1979); Walker v. UCBR, 367 A.2d 522 (Pa. Cornrow. 1976). 
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professed in class. I was able to use the rules, even in their 
most informal state, to the client's advantage. And nurse "W," 
as her own "discoverer," allowed us to use the informality of an 
administrative hearing to her ultimate benefit. It was great to 
be back! 
III. THE THEME: How To "Kiss" AND MAKE GOOD 
One of the lessons I try to convey in my Evidence class is 
that, in whatever forum - be it negotiation, mediation, board-
room, or courtroom - it behooves the advocate to advance a 
"theme." The purpose is to capture the essence of the case in 
four or five words to catch the attention of the audience or arbi-
ter. One's proof centers around this theme. I am essentially 
suggesting that we strive to boil our cases down to a sort of 
mantra, one that will encapsulate the proof that will be or has 
been presented. One of my sisters, a non-lawyer and therefore 
possibly much better in getting to the point, uses the term 
"KISS" to emphasize this point- "keep it simple, stupid."6 
While this lesson appears simple on its face, I have noticed 
that it is not always easy to put into practice. Perhaps this is a 
result of having stressed legal analysis so much that students 
have become convinced that analysis equals verbosity. Indeed, 
I am reminded of the difficulty many students have in express-
ing a theme when I ask them to explain their advocacy position 
in six words or less, as if speaking to a layperson (e.g., a juror). 
Almost invariably, I must cut off their explanation some 
twenty-five to thirty words later. 
I was reminded of the importance of themes during my sab-
batical in what became affectionately known in the Legal Ser-
vices office as "The Case of the Bullet in the Monkey's Mouth." 
Client "L" first came into our office having been denied unem-
ployment benefits and after being terminated from employment 
with the state. She was quite articulate and detailed about her 
work history, having kept a journal ofvarious contacts and con-
frontations that had occurred throughout the period of em-
ployment. She informed me that numerous comments had been 
made by her employer regarding not only her conduct at work 
but also her private life. According to "L," her work had never 
been affected by any of these "private" concerns, yet she be-
6. I have yet to take this personally, though perhaps I should. 
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lieved that she was less than welcome in the workplace. So why 
had she lost her job? 
The client had an affection for stuffed animals. One of 
them, a stuffed monkey, had been visibly placed on her work-
station throughout her nearly three years on the job. In its 
mouth, imminently visible, was a bullet. "L" placed it there as a 
self-serving reminder to just do her job, to "bite the bullet" de-
spite office chitchat about her "different" ways. It turned out 
that another state employee, from a separate office, had used 
"L's" desk one day and had seen the missile-mouthed monkey. 
She then reported this to "L's" supervisor. When "L" returned 
to her desk, she was immediately called into a meeting with 
her supervisor and other superiors and told she had been 
placed on probation because she had created a "dangerous" 
situation in the workplace. She was directed to sign a COCE 
(Conditions of Continuing Employment) contract if she wished 
to return to her job. Having no alternative, she signed the con-
tract requiring her to attend state-scheduled appointments 
with appropriate medical personnel for purposes of evaluation 
and recommendations to address the "dangerous situation" and 
possible return to the workplace. 
During our initial interview, "L" shared a copy of the COCE 
contract with me. She informed me that she had indeed at-
tended the sessions the state had scheduled and had been di-
agnosed as fit to return to the job. "L" subsequently did return 
to the job, and then used leave time to see her own physician 
for a separate problem. Her supervisor requested that "L" pro-
vide her with copies of those additional medical records, claim-
ing "L's" private treatment was covered by the COCE contract. 
"L" refused to do so, believing that it was not legally required. 
The state then sought this information directly from the medi-
cal provider, without success. Despite threats of termination, 
"L" maintained her unwillingness to provide this separate 
medical documentation. She was subsequently terminated and 
sought assistance from Legal Services. 
I knew in advance that the employer would be represented 
at the hearing. The employer's counsel learned of my represen-
tation of "L" and contacted me to seek my consent for presenta-
tion of telephonic testimony of certain state witnesses who 
would not be able to appear at the hearing. While I recognized 
that it might be difficult to cross-examine a witness I had never 
met and could never look in the eye, at least I had the benefit of 
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knowing beforehand the names of the particular adverse wit-
nesses. I was also aware that although "[i]n-person testimony 
is normally preferable," testimony by phone was allowed for 
"compelling reasons."7 Moreover, I sensed that I might be able 
to use the physical absence of the witnesses to my advantage 
when it came to questions of credibility. 
I realized the stakes were high when "L" revealed that she 
had filed a state grievance procedure, and two separate com-
plaints with the Human Resources Department. This led me to 
an additional witness: "L's" union representative. At first she 
was hesitant to discuss the case with me without the approval 
of the union's counsel, but she later proved to be quite accom-
modating in her explanations of the conditions under which "L" 
had signed the COCE contract. Despite her cooperation, she 
requested that I subpoena her to the hearing. I believed this 
would be to "L's" advantage; a presumably favorable witness 
had been "compelled" to testify, thus mitigating any claims that 
might be raised concerning her credibility. 
The search for a "theme" necessarily began early in the life 
of this case. As I often stress in class, I started with my closing 
argument and worked backwards to determine just what proof 
I would need to support my position. A component of this clos-
ing was to determine how best to encapsulate the event: "They 
violated her privacy;" "A stuffed animal, openly displayed;" 
"The contract was vague;" and "She honored the contract" all 
played out in my head. As the hearing neared, I became con-
vinced that the case called for a "cumulative" theme: one ad-
dressing the law, another focused on public policy, and a third 
based on the use of demonstrative evidence. 
The hearing was lengthy, in contrast to the typical unem-
ployment compensation case. Nearly four hours of testimony 
centered on the events leading to the COCE contract (the bullet 
in the monkey's mouth), the interpretation of that contract (the 
ambiguity of the terms), and the aftermath of the contract 
(honored by "L," an invasion of privacy by the state). At the be-
ginning of the hearing, I asked the hearing officer to offer into 
evidence pictures of the by now "notorious" bullet-mouthed 
monkey, which was all of five inches tall ("L" hesitated in part-
ing with the monkey itself by tendering it as an exhibit). I then 
placed the actual monkey, bullet properly inserted, on the 
7. See 34 PA. CODE§§ 101.127 et seq. 
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counsel table within a few feet of the hearing officer. Testimony 
supported our contention that the monkey had been conspicu-
ous for over two years, that "L" had attended her state-
scheduled doctors' appointments, that those medical providers 
had indicated that she could return to the job without further 
therapy, and that the state sought medical information from 
"L" based on subsequent visits she had scheduled on her own. 
Even the telephonic questioning of the state's faceless wit-
nesses proved positive; they stumbled in their efforts to define 
the meaning of certain terms of the COCE contract. All of this 
played into the cumulative theme presented in my closing ar-
gument. The state had failed to prove that "L" had committed 
"willful misconduct." More significantly, the "contract was 
vague" (the stumblings by the telephonic witnesses were abo-
nus), and she had "honored her commitments" by attending the 
state scheduled appointments. The "state had invaded her pri-
vacy." Public policy should not condone the state seeking out 
medical evidence from its employees who seek their own pro-
fessional assistance and then "punish" employees for not dis-
closing such information. In addition, "a stuffed animal, always 
conspicuous" did not create a "dangerous condition" (quite de-
monstrably, the furry creature obediently perched in front of 
the hearing officer for the entirety of the hearing- no one ap-
s peared endangered). 
The decision came within the week, and it was wholly fa-
vorable for "L." Indeed, the decision read like my theme, noting 
the vagueness of the COCE contract, the compliance by "L," 
and the overreaching by the state. Perhaps the hearing officer 
remembered my own comments about how, if the state's con-
duct was upheld, even hearing officers, being state employees, 
could be subject to such overreaching. There was no comment 
about our little stuffed friend being present at the hearing, but 
I do believe it had its positive effect. 9 Ultimately, our theme 
rang true and provided the basis for this favorable decision. 
8. The student intern who worked with me on this case commented that the use 
of the stuffed monkey had presented a "Seinfeldian" moment to the otherwise dry liti-
gation process; I suspect that this is another evidentiary concept I will need to consider 
before this semester's Evidence class. 
9. Apparently, these furry critters have staying power. As a going-away present 
at the end of my sabbatical, the Legal Services staff presented me with a stuffed mon-
key, with, of course, a bullet in its mouth. It is prominently-and conspicuously-
displayed in my office; I have not, as yet, been subject to any disciplinary threats! 
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IV. THE USE OF RULES: EDUCATING THE HEARING OFFICER 
As fate would have it, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
adopted state Rules of Evidence shortly before my sabbatical 
began. This marked the first time that state court proceedings 
would be so governed. These rules did not apply to non-court 
tribunals, such as administrative agencies, except as provided 
by law or unless the tribunal chose to apply them. 10 Neverthe-
less, they provided a framework for hearing officers to deter-
mine whether proof was more reliable than not. The new rules, 
with which I was already familiar due to my service on the 
State Bar Committee on Evidence, were to go into effect during 
my sabbatical. This presented me with an opportunity to share 
my expertise with my Legal Services colleagues and test out 
the rules on my own. 
The very occasion to do this emerged in the case of client 
"H," a laborer who had been terminated after twenty-fours 
years with his industrial employer. The separation notice indi-
cated that "H" had been fired for "insubordination." The spe-
cific violation was not wearing earplugs as required by ear 
company policy. "H" readily admitted to me that he had not 
worn earplugs but maintained that he was not acting in defi-
ance - indeed, he had been instructed by his doctors not to 
wear inner ear protection due to an ear infection. He remained 
willing to wear over-the-ear protection as the job required. 
The difficulty arose in finding proof to support "H's" posi-
tion. The medical documentation that "H" had submitted when 
his benefits claim was initially rejected revealed that his doc-
tors had stated four years earlier that he should not wear ear-
plugs because of an ear infection, but that this condition had 
since healed. A four-year gap in medical documentation ended 
on the date of his dismissal. The post-termination medical re-
ports again indicated some irritation inside the ear. Curiously, 
it was "H" himself who had submitted the entirety of this medi-
cal documentation, even though the post-diagnostic notes indi-
cated that healing had occurred. "H" insisted that he had 
shared at least two separate doctor's notes with his prior su-
pervisor in 1994 concerning his ongoing ear problems. The em-
ployer responded that he had only received an earlier note 
without any update on his condition. Moreover, "H" had signed 
10. Comment of 1997 Ad Hoc Committee on Evidence to Rule 101. 
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an attendance form indicating that he had attended a meeting 
in which he was instructed in the use of earplugs and he had 
agreed to use those plugs. 
During our office conferences, one of "H's" difficulties be-
came evident. He was functionally illiterate, having been per-
manently expelled from school in the ninth grade. Although he 
had advanced to that grade, he had always been placed in spe-
cial education classes and was never taught the basics. As are-
sult, "H" found himself frequently the object of practical jokes 
at work when others would falsely tell him the contents of vari-
ous posters and memos. Rather than admit his inadequacies 
he tried to bide them. When individuals in management circu: 
lated forms or petitions to be signed, be just etched his name. 
Such was the case with the attendance form concerning the 
earplugs. This form was brought to his workstation and he was 
told to sign it without the opportunity to have it explained to 
him. 
My series of conferences with "H" left me wondering 
whether he actually knew, at least according to his doctors' 
notes, that his ear ailments had healed. He insistently stated 
that they had never informed him. He explained that his ear 
condition was the result of an injury suffered during childhood, 
and that his ear had become inflamed and leaked intermit-
tently since that time. Accordingly, he did not believe that he 
had any reason to continue seeing ~is do~tors after _1994, ~s he 
understood he would just have to hve with these difficulties-
albeit without having to wear earplugs. I attempted to obtain 
verification concerning the "H's" actual knowledge by contact-
ing those doctors; I never was able to get past the nurses, nor 
was I able to learn exactly what had been disclosed to "H." All 
suggestions that those doctors testify on behalf of "H" were met 
with the response that "there would be a $600 fee for any tes-
timony." 
The only other recourse was to seek testimony from "H's" 
union representative, who had been present at the grievance 
hearing that had been held upon his termination. According to 
that representative, one of the attendees was "H's" former su-
pervisor. This supervisor admitted at the meeting that "H" had 
indeed handed him two doctors' notes explaining his ear condi-
tion in 1994, both of which recommended that he not wear in-
ner ear protection until his condition had healed. The supervi-
sor admitted that he had acquiesced to "H" not wearing such 
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protection. Unfortunately, the latter of those two notes could 
not be found, that prescribing doctor had since retired and de-
stroyed his files, and there was no subsequent documentation 
in the personnel file. The words of this former supervisor could 
support both "H's" contentions that he had both provided no-
tice to his employer and had been relieved of the requirement 
to wear inner ear protection. We therefore intended to rely on 
these statements by that supervisor, as the agent of the party-
opponent (employer), to provide favorable evidence at the hear-
ing. 
As fate might have it, the newly enacted Pennsylvania 
Rules of Evidence had gone into effect shortly before the day of 
our hearing. The hearing officer, from my prior experiences, de-
ferred to rules of courtroom procedure. I believed this to be to 
our benefit; the new Rules contained a hearsay exception that 
allowed for admission of "a statement by the party's agent or 
servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or 
employment, made during the existence of the relationship" of-
fered against a party.u Nonetheless, I was aware that this ex-
ception, although accepted in the overwhelming majority of 
other states, was new to Pennsylvania law. I anticipated some 
difficulties in the application of this new rule of law. 
The hearing itself went smoothly, despite what I can only 
describe as the "attack dog" mentality of the employer's coun-
sel. He was more than adversarial, alternatively displaying 
both sarcasm and belligerence towards many of the witnesses, 
even belittling "H's" functional illiteracy, which actually por-
trayed "H" in a more sympathetic light. The situation became 
contentious when the union representative attempted to testify 
about the former supervisor's statements that had been made 
at the grievance hearing. Immediately upon the objection by 
the employer's counsel, the hearing officer, without awaiting or 
soliciting a response from me, sustained the objection. When I 
asked to be heard on the objection, the hearing officer sug-
gested that it was unnecessary, because this was clearly hear-
say. However, I persisted in going on the record with an offer of 
proof to explain that the supervisor's comment was the admis-
sion of the party-opponent (the employer) by its agent. Imme-
diately, counsel for the employer and the hearing officer, al-
most in unison, responded by noting that any such exception 
11. PA. R. EVID. 803(25){D). 
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was inapplicable because "H" was no longer employed by this 
employer and, additionally, there was no such exception recog-
nized in the commonwealth. It was then that a true "teaching" 
moment occurred in a forum outside the traditional classroom. 
As a result of the recent passage and implementation of state 
rules of evidence, I was prepared-I offered as exhibits both the 
new "agency of the party-opponent" rule, along with the com-
mentary to that rule supporting its usage. I further suggested 
that both the hearing officer and the employer's counsel" inad-
vertently misunderstood" the effect of this rule, which focused 
on whether the agent of the party-opponent was acting within 
his agency at the time of the statements, not whether the em-
ployee was still working for that employer. In our case, not only 
was the prior supervisor still employed with the company, but 
he had also continued working in that position with no change 
in responsibilities for the past several years. The hearing offi-
cer was swayed by this explanation and reversed her ruling on 
the spot; the employer's counsel was clearly flustered. The un-
ion representative was then able to testify that "H's" former 
supervisor had admitted at the grievance hearing that "H" had 
provided two doctor's notices, putting the employer on notice of 
his inner ear problems. The employer did not submit any 
counterproof to this evidence. 
Ultimately, we received a favorable decision. Among the 
reasons listed supporting that ruling were the statements of 
admission by the former supervisor. Yes, it also helped that the 
record revealed no proof that "H" had been advised of the sup-
posed improvement in his ear condition, that he had in good 
faith continued to believe he had problems because of ongoing 
symptoms in his ear, and that he was indeed willing to wear 
over-the-ear protection (which was not offered to him). How-
ever, admissions by one's agent can clearly be powerful evi-
dence in support of the opponent's case, especially because of 
that person's "inside knowledge" and the fact that employees 
may be risking their own employment in offering such proof. 
Knowledge was clearly power-the use of the new rules helped 
to both educate and prevail. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As I return to the classroom, I am grateful for the opportu-
nity during my sabbatical to have used academic materials in a 
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different classroom-the real world. I was presented with the 
challenge of employing what I had professed and the insights I 
had learned within the tower to augment my years of pre-
teaching practice. Yes, my years in academia facilitated my 
understanding of concepts, theories, and public policy at a more 
profound level than in my prior life as a practitioner. The big 
picture was much more in focus; I dared not dwell on the 
thoughts of my inadequacies during my earlier tour of practice. 
The picture itself became all the more comforting when I dis-
covered how my months of practice further enhanced my aca-
demic understanding of evidentiary rules and practices in the 
everyday world. I was better off as a practitioner but even more 
so as a professor. 
I appreciated the opportunity to serve in this true-to-life 
laboratory as both an advocate for my Legal Services clients 
and was flattered to remain the teacher for my colleagues on 
evidentiary and trial tactics. I admit that it was also nice to not 
have bluebooks awaiting me at the semester's end. However, I 
will continue to remind myself that as long as clients have 
problems, lawyers will be there to serve; in doing so, the es-
sence of practice has not really changed over the last decade-
we still need to listen, counsel, analyze, and communicate. My 
anxieties had been overstated and truly do learn from our ex-
periences. My years in academia had proven to be the best 
teacher of all. 
